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This paper assesses the role that an unconditional basic income proposal 
(henceforth “UBI”) could play in an alternative economic system to capitalism. 
It is argued that the core UBI proposal could not play this role; only another 
proposal, that the state should act as employer of last resort (henceforth “SELR”) 
could do so in the context of broader institutional and policy change.1 It is further 
argued that a UBI proposal is, in a sense to be explained, a form of political 
 
1 Reference to the core UBI proposal means I should immediately explain, and defend, my 
restricted focus here on Van Parijs’s early Real Freedom for All and not his later arguments 
summarised in Basic Income co-authored with Yannick Vanderborght. [Van Parijs & 
Vanderborght, 2017] Briefly, the former book offers a distinctive argument for a UBI grounded 
on a certain conception of unearned rents – grounded in turn on a certain distinctive conception 
of productive activity. By contrast, in the later book, its policy prescriptions differ little from 
Barbara Bergmann’s “universal basic services” or  UBS proposal. [Bergmann, 2004] Both 
Bergmann [2004] and Van Parijs & Vanderborght [2017] are defences of orthodox welfare 
state capitalism. I do not, therefore,  survey the extensive literature on a UBI in which multiple 
variations on the basic idea have been proposed, but where Van Parijs’s distinctive and original 
early motivation has been obscured. In any case, Real Freedom for All is one of the most 





quietism that leaves in place the most fundamental – and problematic – aspects 
of capitalism. It is also self-stultifying given its inflationary macro-economic 
effect. 
 This paper is written from a certain perspective: that of Rawls’s attempt to 
develop a realistically utopian alternative to capitalism. [Rawls, 1971/1999; 
2001; Thomas, 2017, 2020b] Rawls meant something specific by this: he defined 
a capitalist society as one in which a minority of citizens have monopoly control 
over the means of production. This monopoly control allows them to dictate the 
terms on which others work and, hence, whether other citizens work at all.2 
Rawls endorsed two non-capitalist alternatives: he concluded that we face 
a disjunctive choice between a property-owning democracy or liberal market 
socialism.3 [Rawls, 2001; Thomas, 2017, 2020a] Each of these social systems is 
picked out functionally: each abolishes the monopoly control of the means of 
production by a minority of citizens. Each does so, either by making every citizen 
 
2 The answer to his initial question of whether capitalism can be justified is “of course not – 
but it can be”. [Van Parijs, 1995, p. 226] An “optimal capitalism” is more likely to deliver the 
goal of real freedom than even an optimised socialism. [Van Parijs, 1995, chapter 6] 
3 Importantly for Rawls he believed that this was a legislative choice that each society should 
make in the light of its own history and traditions in its democratic assembly. He did not believe 
that it was up to philosophy to solve “the property question”. For disagreement with him on 




a capitalist, or by making the citizenry as a whole the monopolistic owners of 
capital who then lease it out to worker co-operatives for a fee.4 
 I will show in this paper how this anti-capitalism both explains, and 
justifies, why Rawls opted for the policy of the state as employer as last resort as 
opposed to any form of UBI policy. His asset focused egalitarianism requires that 
we look beyond income streams to the underlying relations of power and control 
in an economy that Rawls connects to the ownership of capital.5 
 
4 I think these options ought to be viewed as two different solutions to the principal-agent 
problem. There are several variations of the liberal market socialist family of views: I mention 
here, as representative, only David Schweickart’s view. A notable aspect of his proposal is its 
commitment to the state as employer of last resort. [Schweickart, 2011, pp. 75–6] Van Parijs 
endorses one of them, Peter Jay’s proposal, which is – as Van Parijs notes – not intended to be 
an “alternative” to capitalism. [Van Parijs, 1995, pp. 209-10; Jay, 1980; Thomas, 2017, pp. 
240–41] 
5 While being sensitive to this distinction between the ownership and the control of capital. As 
Bill Edmundson puts it: “Rawls conceived the entrepreneurial or control aspects of ownership 
as inhering not in capital assets, but in the acquired skills and ‘natural assets’ exercised in 
marshalling and managing capital assets … To say a doctor has a basic right to own a 
stethoscope is to obscure what is important, namely, the excellence that a competent doctor 
manifests in skilfully making use of a stethoscope and other tools of the trade. A right to have 
a stethoscope in this sense is an aspect of the basic right to occupational choice which parties 
in the original position already recognize as a basic liberty. The right to profit from the sale or 
lease of medical instruments is another matter. In this sense of ownership ‘ownership is not a 
productive activity’ as Cambridge economist Joan Robinson put it … Rawls coined the term 
‘pure ownership’ … to capture the idea.” [Edmundson, 2017, p.47] Interpolated references are 




 In one sense, this conclusion is not surprising: the sub-title of Van Parijs’s 
Real Freedom for All is “what (if anything) can justify capitalism”? [Van Parijs, 
1995] His proposal for an unconditional basic income is intended to explain how 
we answer that question. Real freedom is better justified in an “optimised” 
capitalism as opposed to an optimised socialism because it maximises an 
unconditional basic income that is the essence of real freedom for all. [Van Parijs, 
1995, chapter 6] Rawls, however, is not interested in justifying capitalism, but in 
developing a realistically utopian private property system that is an alternative to 
it. [Rawls, 2001] 
 Re-contextualising the dispute between Rawls and Van Parijs in this way 
allows one to avoid the alternative diagnosis that it is based on an equivocation 
between different conceptions of the concept of reciprocity.6 It also explains why 
 
6
 On this diagnosis the risk is that the Rawls/Van Parijs dispute simply becomes a matter of 
crossed purposes. The classic Rawlsian objection to a Van Parijs’ style UBI is that it is 
exploitative as it allows some citizens to take more than their fair share of the good of leisure 
from citizens as a whole. This claim of unfairness is grounded on a specific conception of 
reciprocity that Stuart White describes: “Each person is entitled to a share of the economic 
benefits of social cooperation conferring equal opportunity (or real freedom) in return for the 
performance of an equal handicap-weighted quantum of contributive activity.” [White, 1997, 
p. 318, quoted also in Thomas, 2017, p. 30] For White, this need not take the form of paid work 
for all citizens; however, this is an appropriate conception of reciprocity for those able to work. 
There have been various responses to White’s conception of reciprocity such as Widerquist 
[1999]. This paper tries to take a step back from this dispute and place it in a more fundamental 
context: capitalism versus anti-capitalism. (I am grateful to Mike Howard for reminding me 




there is such a difference in implementation between two views that share the 
same fundamental aims: to de-commodify labour, and to do so by introducing a 
universalist policy – either a universal unconditional basic income, or a universal 
right to fair access to capital combined with SELR.7 
 This paper pursues a variation of Rawls’s method in Justice as Fairness 
where he presents the very idea of choosing a social system. [Rawls, 2001] Rawls 
is using Weber’s method of ideal types and this paper follows the same 
methodology. There is one important difference: my focus here is on a single, 
important, policy choice between UBI or SELR. Further, I argue that it ought to 
be made in Rawls’s way, namely, comparing and contrasting welfare state 
capitalism with Rawls’s two anti-capitalist social systems, liberal market 
socialism and a property-owning democracy. In my view, it is only in the context 
of this broader choice of a social system that the narrower question of UBI versus 
SELR can be decided. This explains why I focus on ideal typical versions of a 
welfare state capitalism that incorporate a UBI and the alternatives that do not.  
 
ought to endorse a UBI only in certain contingent circumstances that lack universal 
applicability.) 
7 In Van Parijs [1995], the book that is my focus here, there is no explicit statement that he 
seeks to de-commodify labour. But functionally that is clearly the role played in his argument 
by Lockean self-ownership: in a society of free people, as opposed to one of slaves, each owns 
him or her self. [Van Parijs, 1995, p.3, §1, §8] For the sense in which SELR is “de-




 The plan of this paper is as follows: section one sets out the two rival 
proposals. Section two contextualises the SELR proposal in the work of Rawls 
and Hyman Minsky and in the context of a broader Keynesian/Kaleckian critique 
of rentier capitalism. Section three argues that Van Parijs’s version of a UBI is 
politically quietistic as it leaves a dominating capitalist class in place while 
masking the effects of only one aspect of their social power. Section four argues 
that Van Parijs’s version of a UBI is unstable, in Rawls’s sense, in that a social 
system that incorporated it would not be able to achieve its egalitarian aims 
without self-stultification. Section five sets out why the alternative SELR policy 
is to be preferred. Section six turns to a poorly supported lemma in the argument 
for SELR: in Minsky’s version of the proposal it is supported via the claim that 
if the state is the employer of last resort, then the pay of the worst off will rise at 
a greater rate than those of the socio-economic class immediately above them in 
the wage structure. That assumption is defended with further arguments 
developed by James K. Galbraith. [Galbraith, 1998/2000] The paper concludes in 
section seven with potential convergence between Van Parijs’s version of “Left 
Rawlsianism” and the version defended here. 
 
1 The Two Proposals 
One of the problems with the recent literature on a UBI proposal is that Van 




which this originality has been obscured. Examining his original proposal 
promises distinctiveness from amidst the plethora of current versions of a UBI.  
Equally important for my purposes is what this proposal is not: it is not the 
restricted thesis that we can avoid bureaucratic waste by making benefits 
unconditional; nor the proposal to consolidate various different kinds of welfare 
benefit into a single streamlined policy; nor the proposal for a small-scale, 
geographically limited pilot UBI scheme; nor is it the universal benefits system 
of a Scandinavian welfare state extended to all benefits in kind as well as cash. 
[Bergmann, 2004] It is these incrementalist or local forms of a UBI that attracts 
eirenic support from both Left and Right – for example forming part of George 
McGovern’s 1972 campaign for the US presidency.8 These versions of a UBI will 
not be discussed in this paper.9 
 
8 In another Quixotic recent development, it is one of the reasons why, faced with 
unemployment generated by automation, the very rentier capitalism driving the political will 
to automate also thinks of a UBI as some sort of utopian remedy for mass unemployment – one 
form of our dominant “philanthrocapitalism”. By contrast, Minsky’s critique of our inherited 
form of rentier capitalism not only demonstrates that, through financialization, it is inherently 
unstable: it also has built in incentives to automation and the replacement of labour by capital. 
[Minsky, 1986/2008] Financialized capitalism incentivises investment in long-term capital 
projects and the employer automating her factory pays tax on the purchase of the machines 
once – at the time of purchase. By contrast, the employer pays an on-going payroll tax per 
employee as part of the state’s automatic “tax and transfer” schemes.  
9 And, as John Roemer noted in his notably critical account of Van Parijs’ original “capitalist 
road to communism”, their success or failure has no bearing at all on the prospects for the 




 Van Parijs’s proposal is, then, distinctive in its ambition; its form, namely, 
unconditional cash payments that cannot be “capitalized”; not payment “in kind”; 
and its ground, namely, unearned rents inherent in every less than technically 
perfect employment market (in addition to taxes on gifts and bequests).10 It also 
uses an original method: his first step is to treat jobs as analogous to external 
assets so that he can apply Bill Vickrey’s Georgist method of a land tax auction 
to them. Citizens are assigned “individual tradeable rights” in jobs-as-assets. 
[Van Parijs, 1995, p.99, pp. 108–9; Vickrey, 1961] Van Parijs’s crucial second 
step is to argue that: “[F]or jobs to count as assets, they must be in short supply” 
[Van Parijs, 1995, p. 90] To the rejoinder “why are you taking the shortage of 
jobs as a fact of life?”, he responds that all policies to boost employment: 
 [A]mount to using scarce resources in a discriminatory way, with a bias to 
those with a preference for being employed. [Van Parijs, 1995, pp. 91, p. 98, 
chapter 4, section 4.4 passim] 
 
That explains why: 
[A]dopting a policy that focuses on the involuntarily unemployed amounts 
to awarding a privilege to people with an expensive taste for a scarce asset. 
Those who, for whatever reason, give up their share of that asset and thereby 
leave more of it for others, should not therefore be deprived of a fair share 
of its value. [Van Parijs, 1995, p. 109, emphasis added] 
 
10 To maintain the distinctiveness of an UBI as opposed to universal access to capital, Van 
Parijs is explicit that the recipient cannot go to a bank and use her future guaranteed income 
stream to raise capital on “mildly paternalistic” grounds. [Van Parijs, 1995, pp. 45–47] I discuss 
this in Thomas, [2017], p. 207. I am grateful to a referee for this journal for reminding that Van 
Parijs has, on occasion, contemplated a UBI as payable “in kind” from his very first formulation 





If Van Parijs is the clearest proponent of what an UBI would have to be, it is also 
under-appreciated how closely his radical proposal is tied to the specific 
assumptions of his left libertarianism – a point I owe to Michael Schefczyk. 
[Schefczyk, 2013; Thomas, 2017, pp. 195–8] It is this left libertarianism, with its 
Lockean conception of rights, that grounds the claim that a person is entitled to 
compensation, funded by the quasi-rents of an imperfect labour market, if he or 
she has given up her primordial right – held against society as a whole – for a job. 
[Schefczyk, 2013] This argument also involves Van Parijs’s signature claim that 
state policies for full employment are incompatible with liberal neutrality as a 
preference for being employed is an “expensive taste”.11  
Let me turn to the second policy I will be comparing to a UBI: what is the 
policy of the state acting as employer of last resort? Rawls came to adopt this 
commitment as part of his defense of justice as reciprocal fairness. His “worst 
 
11
 Van Parijs argues that real freedom is choice preserving in a non-discriminatory way: anyone 
can choose to work, or not, with the voluntarily unemployed able to employ themselves at any 
time at the UBI rate. [Van Parijs, 1995, p. 213] Technically, of course, under a jobs guarantee 
the same is also true: a person can either work for the state at the minimum wage rate or choose 
not to work and receive the decent civic minimum. The issue is whether the latter policy is 
ultimately grounded on a non-neutral ethical perfectionism and I would argue that it is not. I 
think Schefczyk also demonstrates that Van Parijs’s argument that Rawls’s opposition to a UBI 
depends on an ethicised view of work that is inconsistent with liberal neutrality is incorrect. I 
discuss this further in Thomas, [2017], p. 196 drawing on the important arguments of Torisky 




off’ class are “working members of society” doing meaningful work. [Freeman, 
2013, p. 22] They are expected to be “doing their full share” and able to “manage 
their own affairs”. [Rawls, 2001, p. 131] Rawls simply asserts, without much 
argument, that justice as fairness is committed both to full employment and this 
goal is to be secured by the state. [Rawls, 1993, p. lvii, 2001] The aim of this 
paper is to deepen the rationale for this proposal and, in particular, to relate it to 
a broader project of the de-commodification of labour. [Ellerman, 1992; Hockett, 
2019; Thomas, 2020b] In the next section I will start to develop this argument by 
explaining what I take to be the decisive choice point between SELR and a UBI, 
namely, that only the latter forms part of a decisive break with capitalism. 
 
2 Rawls, Minsky and the Critique of Welfare State Capitalism 
If Rawls seeks an alternative to capitalism then, eo ipso, he seeks an alternative 
to welfare state capitalism. I have noted that Van Parijs’s UBI forms part of a  re-
engineered welfare state capitalism; Rawls, by contrast, sought a decisive break 
with it. [Rawls, 2001] 
Several of Rawls’s critics have argued that he gives a misguided “free 
pass” to a property-owning democracy and liberal market socialism but is 
unreasonably harsh towards the prospects of a suitably reformed and ambitious 
welfare state capitalism. [O’Neill, 2012; Schemmel, 2015; Vallier, 2015] This is 
not the place to engage with those arguments fully, but just as I think it is helpful 




conception of it to the mid-twentieth century economist James Meade, so I think 
is helpful more generally to contextualise justice as fairness in mid-century 
Keynesianism as a whole. [Meade, 1993] For reasons of scope I will focus here 
on one of these neo-Keynesians, Hyman Minsky, because of the closeness of his 
views to Rawls’s and the influence of Minsky’s critique of UBI in the form with 
which he was familiar – the so-called “negative income tax”.12 [Minsky, 2013] 
 A prominent objection to Rawls’s asset focused egalitarianism in his later 
work is that is an unrealistic political ideal that has never been tried. However, it 
can be argued on Rawls’s behalf that there are historical instances of asset focused 
egalitarianism although more commonly in the history of the USA than in other 
countries.13 [Hockett, forthcoming] Secondly, our political context has been 
 
12 Unlike in the case of James Meade, I am not claiming any direct intellectual influence from 
Minsky to Rawls. They were near contemporaries: Rawls (1921–2002) and Minsky (1919–
1996). In my view they independently developed overlapping responses to the same 
circumstances from the same neo-Keynesian set of ideas. 
13 One of the many insights of Robert Hockett’s Republic of Owners is to ask why we would 
want to give citizens capital? One answer is: to given them collateral for credit. To which 
Hockett points out that we can achieve the same goal, for specific classes of asset, not solely 
by giving citizens assets, but also by extending state insurance underwriting for specific 
markets. In the USA, the Federal government has used this complementary form of asset-
focused egalitarianism to secure social goals such as access to education and housing. This 
places Hockett in the Hamiltonian tradition of an American egalitarianism that tends to favour 
monetary policy as the way to realise its aims as opposed to “tax and transfer”. This is for the 
range of reasons explored by both Monica Prasad and Sarah L. Quinn. [Prasad, 2012; Quinn, 




profoundly shaped by asset-focused inegalitarianism. The Reagan/Thatcher 
revolution implemented a range of policies that were focused on assets but 
intended to have inegalitarian results – from the sale of social housing to private 
citizens (without replacement), to the political protection of the rentier class, a 
wave of privatisations of hitherto state-owned industries, to our more recent post-
Crisis policy of quantitative easing.14 
 This observation leads directly to the key point that Keynes sought to 
“euthanize” the rentier class. [Keynes, 1936, pp. 375–6] One objection to a 
property-owning democracy is that it is simply one guise of the Reagan/Thatcher 
attempt to make workers “think like the bosses” by drawing the aspiring upper 
end of the working class into the bourgeoisie (reflecting the origin of one strand 
of this ideal in socially conservative thought). It is a paradigm of “petit rentier” 
capitalism. Yet this misinterpretation ignores the universality of Rawls’s 
proposal: either every citizen holds capital, or we do as a collectivity (as in liberal 
market socialism). This is not, then, the piecemeal extension of capital holding to 
a wider – but not universal – class of citizen-rentiers. 
 
of whether the American “welfare state” is historically distinctive in this way, that is, not 
focused on “tax and transfer”. 
14 QE – central bank purchase of a wide range of assets on the open market – is intended to be 
egalitarian via a wealth effect, but on a trickle-down basis. For QE proposals that are explicitly 
more egalitarian see Hockett [2019b] and Coppola [2019] where every citizen banks directly 
with their central bank and receives “helicopter money” via such an account. See also Hockett 




 Both Neo-Keynesians, and Rawls, are operating with a general diagnosis 
of the flaws of a rentier capitalism in which capital is held by a restricted class of 
citizens whose political motivation is to make capital scarce. Proponents of the 
ideal of a just welfare state view the state as playing the role of an honest broker 
between competing social interests and underwriting a social compact that aligns 
them. Rawls and Minsky believe that any such alliance must prove to be unstable 
over time. Our actual welfare state capitalisms are forms of rentier capitalism and 
that which is distinctive of them is that the state plays the role of dishonest broker 
between competing social interests. It has been captured by, and protects the core 
interests of, the rentier-investment class.15 
 Drawing on the work of Michael Kalecki, Minsky argued that the state has 
various distinctive capacities. [Kalecki, 1971; Minsky, 1988/2008] If it is 
monetarily sovereign, then it is the monopoly supplier of money, permitting 
private money creation in return for a “seignorage fee”.16 [Minsky, 1988/2008; 
 
15 Centrally via the fiction that the state is a corporate person amongst other corporate persons, 
whose socio-economic goals are hostage to being able to raise revenue from wealthy capitalists 
who demand fiscal rectitude from the state so that it represents a good “investment”. This is, 
in essence, Przeworksi & Wallerstein’s famous “structural constraint”. [Przeworski & 
Wallerstein, 1988] 
16 Not every state is monetarily sovereign in this sense. Some have voluntarily surrendered this 
sovereignty, for example, by temporarily pegging its currency to the US dollar. Others have 
voluntarily surrendered this sovereignty indefinitely such as members of the Eurozone who are 





Hockett & Omarova, 2017] Via a central bank, it is the lender of last resort, and 
continually intervenes in the economy to control the interest rate (by buying and 
selling Treasury bonds to inject liquidity) and can intervene decisively in a 
financial crisis by re-valuing toxic assets as if they were money.17 
Minsky was prepared to concede of the welfare state capitalism of his time 
that its automatic tax and transfer systems had succeeded in avoiding 1930s style 
depressions.18 The state achieved this by putting a floor under consumption via 
its automatic buffering mechanisms of contra-cyclical transfer. In doing so it puts 
a floor under prices and hence aggregate corporate profits. This is partially taxed 
back via corporate taxation – this is why Minsky memorably calls corporations 
“tax farmers”.19 The state also, via a central bank, puts a floor under asset prices: 
 
17 In open market operations, “the Fed” buys and sells Treasury instruments from/to its member 
banks, other financial firms, and the general public: “The Fed buys to put money into the 
economy and thereby drive interest rates downward. Or it sells to draw money out of the 
economy and thereby drive interest rates upward.” [Hockett, 2019a, p. 118]. 
18 Yet it is crucial to his critique that it has done so by accident. (“The Rooseveltian program 
of reforms was pre-Keynesian”. [Minsky, 1986/2008, p. 328]) A further contingency is that 
WWII saw an expansion of the state’s public debts which, post-War, had a stabilising function. 
The economics – and the economists – that claimed to have underpinned the success of these 
inclusive decades were, for Minsky, like the proverbial stopped clock that is right twice daily. 
The inadequacy of the underlying theory and policies explains why, for Minsky, this settlement 
collapsed in the 1970s. [Minsky, 1988/2008] Joan Robinson held the same view. [Robinson, 
1976] 
19 As I have noted, those more friendly to welfare state capitalism than Rawls think of it as 
grounded on a social settlement brokered by the state. You might reasonably think of “tax 




lender of last resort interventions and other “circuit breakers” prevent disastrous 
rapid asset deflation. But the overall effect of all these policies, for Minsky, is an 
inflationary bias in the macro-economy. 
In a central bank bailout failing assets, valued at zero, are suddenly 
revalued as if they were money.20 Continual transfers take money from those who 
directly produce consumer goods (non-state employed workers), and who tend to 
consume proportionately less of their income, and transfer that money to those 
who do not directly produce consumer goods, and who tend to consume 
proportionately more of their income.21 In both cases, increased money pursues 
 
firms significant concessions, protections and autonomy in return for which we tax back some 
of their profits for the state. Minsky thinks this is misguided across several dimensions. First, 
the Keynesian state has already underwritten prices at the macro-level by having the capacity 
to go into deficit. Given that the whole corporate sector enjoys this down-side guarantee it does 
not need any further guarantees. Firms, on Minsky’s reckoning, simply pass their corporate tax 
bill on to prices – another inflationary pressure. Tax farming incentivises financialisation, 
because issuing equity can be offset against corporate tax liability – as can various executive 
perks. Financialisation encourages monopoly – bankers want their clients to be price makers, 
not price takers. Minsky’s radical solution is to abolish corporate (and payroll) taxes. Our own 
historical perspective gives us a new take on Minsky’s critique: some very profitable 
companies, whose success is parasitic upon public investments, are adept at trans-national 
corporate tax evasion. See the many examples in Mazzucato [2013] in fields such as technology 
and pharmaceuticals. 
20 Such asset revaluations are not unusual because financial crises are, globally, common. 
[Galbraith, 2014, p. 4] Nor are they limited in scale: the US state issued swap lines in 2019 that 
effectively backstopped global capitalism with a cost running into trillions of dollars in addition 
to its direct interventions into the US economy. [Tooze, 2019]  
21 This claim is “ceteris paribus”: those who work for the state or who deliver services to it also 




the same quantum of produced goods; lender of last resort interventions are 
periodic, automatic transfers are not. 
The monetarist then proposes high structural unemployment as a 
“corrective” for this inflationary bias. Minsky profoundly disagrees: following 
Kalecki he views it as a political choice to put a state-imposed floor under prices, 
profits, and assets, but not employment.22 [Kalecki, 1943] His Keynesian ideal 
solves this equation differently: how does a full employment, mass consumption, 
society control inflation?23 [Minsky, 1975; 1988/2008] 
 
that the state sector ought to be no larger than is required to compensate for deficiencies in 
private investment in a contra-cyclical way (assuming full employment). [Minsky, 1986/2008, 
pp. 3330–333] See also Fazi and Mitchell [2017], p. 196.  
22 Gourevitch and Stanczyk also draw on Kalecki to make the same point. [Gourevitch & 
Stanczyk, 2018] Kalecki’s point is that the Keynesian ideal would make profits even higher for 
the rentier-investor class, even if workers received a higher share of the productive surplus – 
but the cost in terms of loss of political power is viewed by this class as reason to reject full 
employment. Van Parijs discusses this structural “profits squeeze” view and it is one of the 
main motivations for his radical “optimising” of capitalism as a response to it. [Van Parijs, 
1995, pp. 208–10] But see section 7, below, for a discussion of whether his views of 
globalisation undercut this response. 
23 For the sake of completeness, I will mention one attempt to use one part of Minsky’s ideas 
– his view of endogenous money – to undercut another part, namely, his critique of UBI.  As 
Fazi and Mitchell note, orthodox proponents of a USI want it to be “fiscally neutral”. [Fazi & 
Mitchell, 2017, p. 227] Yet Minsky is one of the intellectual progenitors of modern monetary 
theory. Does that not make the whole question of the “affordability” of a UBI moot? The state, 
as monopoly supplier of money, can create as much money as it needs – with a keystroke – at 
its central bank. Unfortunately, matters are not so simple. Proponents of MMT such as 
Stephanie Kelton, Pavlina Tcherneva and James Galbraith are right that such large scale 




Minsky is one of the originators of modern monetary (or money) theory: 
while there is typically an institutional division between monetary and fiscal 
policy in a monetarily sovereign state the two are essentially connected. Monetary 
policy introduces liquidity to the macro-economy by controlling the rental price 
of money (the interest rate). It does so, by convention, using the antiquated system 
of buying and selling Treasury bonds on the open market in so-called “open 
market operations”.24 [Hockett, 2019a] Fiscal policy also constrains the money 
supply by extinguishing money via taxation. But fiscal policy is not the state 
raising revenue, and Treasury bond sales are not a form of “borrowing” from 
wealthy capitalists (in a way that would respect the structural constraint).25 Taxes 
 
because other macro conditions do not hold, notably, full employment. Under Minsky’s 
idealised Keynesianism, injecting too much “keystroke” money into the economy would be 
inflationary and proponents of MMT do not deny it. For balanced discussions see Wray [2015] 
chapter 9; Galbraith [2019].   
24 It is, therefore, a major change – at least from the point of view of public understanding of 
monetary policy – that so-called “open market operations” are being supplanted, in the case of 
the USA, by the Federal Reserve paying “interest on reserve” deposits held overnight by 
member banks at the Fed. [Hockett & James, unpublished ms., p. 58] “IOR”, as it is known, is 
a different solution to the technical problem described by Bill Mitchell in Fazi & Mitchell 
[2017], p. 189. 
25 A monetarily sovereign state can, of course, decide to create a “safe haven” asset for its 
citizens (and when interest rates on Treasury bonds go below zero citizens have to pay a fee 
for such safety). And it would be naïve to ignore the crucial role that US dollar denominated 
Treasury debt plays in international political economy and America’s role in the global 
economy. But such bonds are not issued because a state, that can simply create money, needs 




and Treasury bond sales/purchases, on this conception, function solely as macro-
economic stabilisers and the monetarily sovereign state simply issues currency to 
realise its goals. [Lerner, 1943; Wray, 2012; Fazi & Mitchell, 2017, chapter 8] 
Minsky accepts Kalecki’s diagnosis that it is the rentier class, engaged in 
a struggle with entrepreneurs over the division of the surplus, who do not want 
the state to put a floor under employment because that would politically 
strengthen the working class in the distributional struggle. [Kalecki, 1943] But 
the implication of this is that unemployment is only a “cure” for a wholly 
avoidable, self-inflicted, disease of inflation willingly accepted by one form of 
capitalism – that driven solely by the class interests of the rentier. 
Minsky’s critique of a UBI is emerging: if introduced it would exacerbate 
a general inflationary tendency in tax and transfer egalitarianism while adding 
further incentives for labour market withdrawal – that I will detail below – that 
make the policy self-stultifying.26 By self-stultification I mean, simply, that its 
normative goal and its means are at odds with each other: the means frustrate the 
end. But this specific critique is embedded in a more general critique of the 
politics of rentier capitalism as that is played out through the evolution of a 
welfare state capitalist society. That a UBI proposal fails to undermine the 
 
literally false, although some monetarily sovereign states choose to impose a version on 
themselves in a form of “self-binding”. [Fazi & Mitchell, 2017, pp. 188–9] 





structural conditions of power in such societies is the basis of a wider charge that 
Van Parijs’s proposal is politically quietistic – an argument that I will now detail. 
 
3 Van Parijs’s Proposal as a form of Political Quietism 
Given the connection I have established between Rawls’s anti-capitalism and 
Minsky’s interpretation of Keynes (and Kalecki) I am now in a position to explain 
why I take Van Parijs’s UBI to be politically quietistic.  
 First, and I think most damagingly, the core argument of Real Freedom for 
All thinks involuntary unemployment is probably inescapable.27 [Van Parijs, 
1995, chapter 4] Once he has exhausted his “Georgist” intuitions about the 
taxation of gifts and bequests, which Van Parijs concedes would raise a very 
small amount of GDP to fund a nugatory UBI, he moves on to rents in the labour 
market. [Van Parijs, 1995, p. 102, §4.4] However, his conception of that market 
is the neo-classical, Walrasian, one where rents to be taxed away exist only if jobs 
are scarce. The crucial passage is this: 
In a non-Walrasian economy … people’s endowment is not exhaustively 
described by their wealth … and their skill: the holding of a job constitutes 
a third type of asset …. In the case of scarce land, we gave each member of 
 
27 There are technical solutions to full employment, but Van Parijs thinks that in fact optimal 
capitalism will have persistent involuntary unemployment, “intrinsic to capitalism”, of which 
it can only be said that optimal socialism does no better at solving it. [Van Parijs, 1995, p. 212] 
Clearly, the Keynes/Kalecki tradition does not share this scepticism. Responding to Van Parijs 
[1991] Fazi and Mitchell argue that “there is no recognition that mass unemployment is the 
result of a deficiency of total spending in the economy …. largely the result of defective 




the society concerned a tradable entitlement to an equal share of that land, 
and the endowment-equalizing  level of the basic income was given by the 
per capita competitive value of the available land. Similarly, in the case of 
scarce jobs, let us give each member of the society concerned a tradable 
entitlement to an equal share of those jobs. The endowment-equalizing level 
of the (additional) basic income will then similarly be given by the per capita 
competitive value of the available jobs. If involuntary employment is high, 
the corresponding basic income will be high. If all unemployment is 
voluntary, no additional basic income is justified by this procedure. [Van 
Parijs, 1995, p. 108, emphasis added] 
 
This is a clear statement of the dependence of the UBI proposal (above a nugatory 
level) on the assumptions of rentier capitalism; it also explains why the proposal 
forms part of a politics of redress.28 
Second, it is true that Van Parijs’ version of a UBI removes the exclusive 
power that monopoly control over the means of production gives capitalists to 
dictate the terms on which others labour for income.29 But that, I will argue, is 
not enough. The rentier class  has other destabilizing forms of political and 
economic power that a UBI proposal leaves untouched. 
 
28 For example, “In a situation of persistent massive unemployment, there is no doubt that the 
sum total of these rents would greatly swell the amount available for financing the grant”. [Van 
Parijs, 1995, p. 108] Van Parijs offers two hypotheses of the source of rent: the insider-outsider 
hypothesis and the efficient wage hypothesis as explanations of involuntary unemployment. 
The former simply attaches rent to an employee occupying a role derived from the costs of 
firing them and hiring a replacement; in the latter, a component of the explanation is that 
“workers shirk less if the cost to them of losing their job is higher”. [Van Parijs, 1995, p. 107]. 
But see the previous footnote. 
29 He notes its connection to “the revolt against proletarian subjection to the wage relationship, 




Specifically, the rentier class dictates the terms of positional competition, 
the level of private versus public debt, and the interest rate – because it makes 
capital scarce via its political action. [Keynes, 1936; Minsky, 2013] In the face 
of any enhancement to the political strength of the working class, the rentier class 
threatens capital flight or capital strike. As we will see, while sensitive to this 
issue Van Parijs thinks that in our globalised world we cannot effectively address 
it. [Van Parijs, 1995, pp. 228–230] His version of a UBI does not eliminate this 
structural source of domination in the power of the rentier-investor class, rather 
it ameliorates one of its effects. 
It is analogous to the “masking” of a disposition: the wine glass you have 
just dropped would have shattered, were it not in the packing material in which it 
was just delivered. Its dispositional property – fragility – has been masked by a 
counter-disposition of pressure from a soft packaging material that absorbs the 
impact from your kitchen floor. But the disposition remains in place. By analogy, 
the problem with Van Parijs’s politics of redress is that while it masks one effect 
of dominating power of a distinct capitalist class it leaves others in place. It is a 
reasonable hypothesis that a society with a dominating rentier-investor class is 
exposed to other ill effects, in addition to dictating the terms on which others 
labour.  
For example, the structure of rentier capitalism forces the non-rentier to 
seek to emulate the positional advantages of the rentier class via what Veblen 




This is exacerbated when the goods of social mobility (healthcare, education, 
housing) are sucked into the domain of the positional.30 [Drennan, 2015] 
Positional spending now becomes what Fred Hirsch calls a “defensive necessity”; 
but under conditions of (self-perpetuating) inequality this pecuniary emulation is 
paid for by private consumer debt whose interest rate is set by the rentier class.31 
[Hirsch, 1976] From either a Keynesian or an MMT perspective the results are 
wholly predictable: financial instability, crisis, and an exacerbation of inequality 
that makes this entire process self-perpetuating.32  
It also leads to that which Minsky calls “demand pull” inflation – another 
macro-level inflationary pressure. It is Robert H. Frank who emphasizes that we 
 
30 As Minsky points out, the form of corporate socialism represented by the US healthcare 
industry causes extensive collateral economic damage. As Dean Baker has noted, given that 
health insurance is provided via private employers in the USA it becomes another expensive 
poll or head tax that discourages employment as opposed to squeezing more hours from 
existing workers. [Baker, 2016, p. 35] It is also passed through to prices. 
31 One response to this argument might be that we ought to restrict the social power of the 
wealthy by taking many goods off the market and insisting that they take the form of public 
goods. But while Van Parijs does contemplate part of an “in kind” UBI being public goods, he 
thinks the class of such goods will be very narrow: “essential ingredient[s] of the means made 
available to every member of society in pursuit of her conception of the good life”. [Van Parijs, 
1995, p. 44] (The argument does not even extend to healthcare without further considerations. 
[p.45]) 
32 For the Keynesian perspective see Galbraith [1998/2000] or Palley [2012, 2013]. For an 
MMT diagnosis see Fazi & Mitchell, 2017, pp. 197–8. Van Parijs gives an (optimistic) account 





are not dealing here with the “politics of envy”. Either you borrow too much to 
live in a school that guarantees a better quality of education for your children, or 
you do not, but your motive is not the unethical, or morally shallow, one of envy. 
[Frank, 2007]  
This is not the claim that the rentier class innocently goes about its business 
while acting negligently towards other classes: it serves its class interests actually 
to drive down the cost of labour and to increase the cost of borrowed capital. 
[Temin, 2017] I conclude that the serious problem for the UBI proposal is that 
removing the capacity of those who control capital to dictate the terms on which 
others labour – by giving citizens an income independent of labour via a UBI – 
only goes a partial way to addressing the political problem of the rentier class. 
If this first objection is convincing, then a further argument follows on 
from it. If the rentier class encourages positional competition, then that in turn 
has a knock-on effect on the idea of the “sufficient” level of an UBI. The problem 
is this: one of the difficult questions about a UBI is its actual amount and what 
counts as sufficient standard for a person’s wellbeing. 
Consider Adam Smith’s criterion that sufficient provision allows the 
representative worst-off person to appear in public without shame.33 Does a high 
level of competition for positional goods increase the material cost of meeting 
 





this criterion? I would argue that it does. This ties in, directly, to the question of 
whether or not Van Parijs’ view is realistically utopian: how much will the 
amount paid actually be, relative to any given society? He says, as is well-known, 
that the actual amount to be paid out is to be “as high as it can be”. We simply do 
not know, then, what its economic effects are going to be as we do not know its 
level in adVance. 
The less serious issue here is the practical paradox that we do not know the 
effect of a UBI on incentives to work, relative to the different cultures of 
capitalism, and the social norms of different societies until after we have 
implemented it. Only at that point can we determine how it interacts with these 
other social norms. But it must be introduced at some level or other; it seems we 
cannot know which one without information we can only obtain were the correct 
figure already known in advance.34 However, these seem to me less serious 
problems than the tension between the fact that Van Parijs’s proposal leaves a 
rentier class intact that fans the flames of positional competition and the fact that 
Van Parijs caps the total amount of resource available for a UBI by grounding it 
on unearned rents (both Georgist rents and labour market rents).  
We can draw a summative conclusion from the previous arguments: there 
is a dilemma for Van Parijs’s view that arises from the grounds on which a UBI 
 
34 A corollary of this problem is that we do not know what the effects of a UBI will be on our 
other egalitarian aims. [Kenworthy, 2014; Gourevitch & Stanczyk, 2018, section 3] As a 




is funded. He has pioneered looking for a source of unearned rents in the economy 
to fund a UBI. We can imagine extending this search in certain ways, for example, 
a shifting technological frontier might create new forms of land, such as the 
auctioning off of broadband licenses. Until a new technology was invented that 
needed those frequencies, that asset was not a source of rents. Georgists takes the 
whole category of land (as a factor of production) to be a candidate to be placed 
under social ownership. [Kerr, 2017; Posner & Weyl, 2018] As it is always 
exogenous to the productive process and cannot be “improved”, land is a source 
of pure rent.35 [Mill, 1848] 
My objection to all of these proposals, both the Georgist proposal and Van 
Parijs’ extension of it, is that if a UBI can only be grounded on unearned pure 
rents, then that places a finite cap on our egalitarian ambitions.36 When Van Parijs 
says a UBI ought to be as high as it can be, he is not being explicit that there is a 
hard constraint on that number, namely, the total value of exogenously given land 
or other sources of pure economic rent (including labour market rents). 
This now supports a dilemmatic argument: I have claimed that introducing 
a UBI does not “euthanise the rentier” as Keynes sought to do. The social power 
 
35 Rent, as opposed to quasi-rent, because unlike the bases of the latter land does not “wear 
out” so it does not incur amortization costs. Georgism is based on the underlying value of land, 
not its value after “development”, so in that sense its value is always exogenously given. 
36 To be clear: I have no objection at all to Georgist land taxation as that is a central part of the 
property-owning democracy tradition. I object solely to the assimilation of employment rents 




of the wealthy is masked in one respect but tolerated in another. The rentier class 
will still dictate the terms of positional competition and exert its political power 
to determine the interest rate paid by those forced to finance their pecuniary 
emulation through credit. The salient point here is that positional competition 
makes the Smith ideal of sufficiency – of appearance in public without shame – 
a moving target. And this target total inexorably moves upwards.37 
Therefore, if a UBI is tied to this sufficientarian ideal, then it will have to 
be uncapped; yet grounding it on unearned rents caps it. Only a UBI combined 
with the euthanasia of the rentier class can avoid this outcome; but there is 
nothing in the UBI proposal, taken alone, that corresponds to Keynes’s goal of 
dismantling the rentier class’s political power to make capital scarce.38 
 
37 There is one obvious response to this argument: at the very least, it is a “tu quoque” response 
– property-owning democrats are in favour of sovereign wealth funds. Are they not paradigms 
of unearned rents on land that are, prima facie, socially owned and whose dividends ought to 
be paid out to all citizens? Three responses: there is a random, lottery like element to whether 
a nation-state has such natural resources. Secondly, these resources are a paradigm of 
unsustainable, non-renewable, capital – until the proceeds of their sale are invested in other 
capital stocks that are productive. Thirdly, the negative externalities of such funds are being 
carried by the global community, not necessarily the nation-states that benefited from their sale 
absent global “Pigouvian” taxes. For all these reasons, then, I think these are special cases – 
certainly to be distinguished from Meade’s plan for a societal unit trust in all stocks, or the 
Meidner plan for moving corporate stock gradually under the control of organised labour. 
Gourevitch and Stanczyk also make the point that, contingently, the stock of capital required 
is not enough to fund a UBI in the USA. [Gourevitch & Stanczyk, 2018, section 3] 
38 To be precise, Van Parijs thinks that the best case scenario is enhanced democratic control 




These cumulative objections to a UBI work together: by leaving the 
structural domination of the economy by the rentier-investor class in place, a UBI 
leaves what counts as a sufficient level of funding hostage to its political power. 
A putatively “sufficient” UBI will have to be revised continually upwards. On 
the other hand, there is a hard cap on the total amount of unearned rent to be 
extracted from the Georgist conception of land or even from “jobs as assets”. 
There is a mis-match between the continual pressure to revise a UBI ever higher 
in response to positional pressure, and the hard cap on its total funding given that 
this must consist entirely in the total sum of unearned rents.  
It is, of course, open to Van Parijs to object that his view can naturally be 
extended to the assets of the rentier class: these assets are only given value by 
being kept scarce via a high interest rate. But expropriating the assets of the 
rentier class differs from expropriating the “windfall” rents from broadband 
licenses, or the Georgist treatment of land, or the rents inherent in a labour market. 
This asset holding depends on the propensity of individuals to save, or to 
consume: it is dependent on individual voluntary decision, not the rents inherent 
in productive activity per se. I will return to this point in the final section of this 
paper where it is crucial to the convergence between Van Parijs’s egalitarian 
ambitions and those of the Rawlsian. Once he has re-located his target as 
 
flee the country (given that formal freedom includes the right to migrate). It seems, then, that 
under the assumptions he makes about globalisation a higher UBI involves a negotiated 




productive assets Van Parijs becomes a (fully fledged) property-owning 
democrat. 
This strategic, macro-economic quietism can be accompanied by a tactical 
quietism over political agency. Alex Gourevitch and Lucas Stanczyk’s concern 
over the political agency required for an UBI initially overlooks the point that its 
source is in unearned rents. [Gourevitch & Stanczyk, 2018] But their argument is 
that, to realise our egalitarian goals, proponents of an UBI will have to sequester 
the assets of the rentier class – not simply labour market or land rents. They are 
implicitly recognizing that Van Parijs’s hard cap on our egalitarian ambitions is 
not enough. So their argument complements mine when they argue that an UBI 
proposal undercuts the very agency of radical change – organized labour – that is 
the sole plausible agent of such radical social change that could build a social 
coalition strong enough to seize some proportion of the assets of the wealthy. 
[Gourevitch & Stanczyk, 2018] 
I am in full agreement with them that a UBI will not strengthen, but 
weaken, the power of organized labour. Employers will, under a UBI regime, 
have a free hand to drive down labour’s share of GDP – notably through 
automation. It is one thing for employers to be faced with the counter-vailing 
pressure of a trade union, that has the ultimate sanction of the withdrawal of 




of the unemployed recipients of a UBI for whom that threat is unavailable.39 
Gourevitch and Stanczyk’s argument is dilemmatic: either proponents of a UBI 
ignore the need for the social agents that would be powerful enough to bring it 
about, or they simply assume that social power exists, in which case a UBI is 
redundant. 
 
4 UBI is Self-Stultifying 
There is a specific, macro-economic concern about Van Parijs’s UBI that Minsky 
explicitly discusses – under his usual description of it as a “negative income 
tax”.40 His concern is that this policy is self-stultifying because of its effect on 
inflation: the purchasing power of the worst off is boosted, only then to be 
 
39 As Gourevitch and Stanczyk put it, with a UBI in place, employers will be constrained in 
their actions only by democratically legislated law – so the economy will already have been 
democratised.  
40 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for pressing me to clarify the 
differences between a negative income tax and a UBI. He or she is quite right: we cannot know 
Minsky’s attitude to a UBI without interpretation as he does not discuss it. (Rawls, too, 
discusses negative income taxes. See also Van Parijs [1995], pp. 36–38) So I have to 
extrapolate the core feature that a UBI  and NIT unconditionally transfers resource from the 
productive, with a lower marginal propensity to consume, to the non-productive, with a higher 
marginal propensity to consume. Furthermore, it does so at a level that valorises leisure. This 
functional core is shared by both proposals. One point that is in favour of taking inflation 
seriously as a problem for Van Parijs is his insistence that the market prices of endowments 
are an objective marker of their value (“leximin people’s purchasing power”). [Van Parijs, 




undermined. I think, in Rawlsian terms, we can describe it as one aspect of a 
conception of justice proving to be unstable – unable to reproduce itself over time. 
 I have already described Minsky’s general argument that tax and transfer 
schemes, absent an independent commitment to full employment, are of their 
nature inflationary. Those who produce are taxed and that income is moved to 
those who do not produce goods or services for consumption. This latter group 
spend a higher proportion of the transferred resources than those from whom it is 
transferred. Minsky believed that this inherently inflationary transfer was 
exacerbated by a UBI via its impact on labour market participation rates.  
 It is true that some people who are currently involuntarily unemployed 
would, if in receipt of an UBI,  be drawn on to the labour market, namely, those 
currently caught up in benefits traps. But Minsky’s concern is that a significant 
number of those currently on the labour market will withdraw from it. As Minsky 
notes, many of the currently poor cannot attach much value to leisure as leisure 
activities are themselves costly. Not only would a person currently in poverty be 
even more poor if they reduced their market participation, the leisure would be 
inadequate compensation given their lack of resources that would allow them to 
enjoy it. Under a UBI, however, the incentive to introduce more leisure into the 
economy is accompanied with a financial incentive to make use of it. Those 
conditions together are likely to produce substantial exit from the labour market. 
 It follows that, at the macro-level, one the one hand, spending power is 




deliberate upshot of a UBI. However, another macro-effect will be that fewer 
people will participate in the labour market, so that wages will have to be 
increased by employers to “bid up” the value of labour. Only this increased 
remuneration will attract those who could otherwise live on an UBI. As a result, 
employers will increase wages and push that cost through to prices. Minsky 
argued that the resulting inflationary increase will largely cancel out the value of 
a UBI to the worst off, making the policy (from a Rawlsian perspective) self-
stultifying. Even those drawn on to the labour market by being freed from benefits 
traps will see their gains eroded by price inflation.  
 One response that proponents of an UBI can make is that its introduction 
will coincide with an increase in productivity on the part of those who do elect to 
work. Thus, the additional wages required to incentivize labour market 
participation will be compensated for by this productivity increase. My objection 
to this proposal is that it is, unfortunately, working in this argument as a deus ex 
machina. Empirically, the elusive goal of enhanced productivity seems to bear no 
relation to wage rates. [Galbraith, 1998/2000, p.29] We would normally look to 
investment funded innovations to improve productivity, but that is another social 
goal crowded out by the funding of a UBI. 
Another version of this argument put forward by proponents of a UBI is 
that automation will supply the necessary concomitant increase in productivity. 
Unfortunately, since one of the primary motivations for an UBI is a loss of jobs 




is the machine – seems to be offering (once again) only a cure for a disease of 
which it is itself the cause. It is a presupposition of this discussion that current 
capital holders have a completely free hand to replace workers with automation 
as they choose – even if the result is greatly increased inequality and concurrent 
social costs.  
Once again, my objection is to the quietism of the UBI proposal: a UBI 
popularizes demand by shifting resources towards those more likely to consume 
and away from “excessive” savings. But unlike the SELR proposal, it fails to 
balance this out by investing in the productive capacity of individuals and firms. 
There is nothing in a UBI proposal that can guarantee a productivity increase to 
cancel out the inflationary losses that it will cause. 
The real point of contrast is between the self-stultifying way in which an 
UBI leads to inflation that negates most of its good effects for the worst off, and 
a Rawlsian proposal widely to disperse capital, to ensure fair access to it, and to 
aim at reasonable equity in its distribution. You can either take SELR to be a 
policy contained already in this general description – if you include human capital 
as capital – or as complementary to it. [Thomas, 2017, p. 403, fn. 41, 2020b] 
The final issue to be addressed is the comparative one: if this paper claims 
that the policy of SELR achieves our egalitarian goals in a stable why, while an 
UBI does not, what guarantees that the former policy is not inflationary in the 
same way? Minsky believes that the transition from slack to tight full 




The high wage worker and other affluent citizens have been subsidized, by 
way of low product prices, by the poor… tight full employment … will lead 
to cost-push inflation. [Minsky, 2013a, p. 10] 
 
 But once tight full employment is in place “this source of inflationary pressure 
will cease”; but only if we take “countermeasures”. [Minsky, ibid] This is why 
Minsky favours a relative incomes policy: with SELR in place, the hitherto worst 
off will stop cross-subsidising the affluent through their poverty. Yet their 
comparative wage increases will produce inflation in the cost of that which they 
produce; so in other parts of the economy productivity gains will have to not be 
matched by wage gains on the part of the comparatively affluent. Minsky thinks 
that will not be hard to do given that comparatively higher wages are extensively 
the product of rent seeking niches guaranteed to certain firms and sectors. 
 Here, once again, Kalecki’s diagnosis is crucial: in a tight labour market 
with a greatly strengthened bargaining power for labour, it is the more skilled 
who will do better than other workers in extracting rents from employers. This 
was why Kalecki thought the rentier-investor class would not permit this loss of 
managerial control. But with full employment, does the sympathiser with Minsky 
and Rawls, such as myself, accept this rent extraction with equanimity? Is this 
not the very point – the blackmail of all of us by the talented – that led Jerry 
Cohen to claim that Rawls’s difference principle was a flawed compromise with 
human selfishness by permitting such special incentive demands? [Cohen, 2008] 




seeking based on special incentives has been eliminated. [Smith, 1998; Thomas, 
2017, p.90]  
But why is a SELR non-inflationary when a UBI is? For the reason given 
by Bill Mitchell: 
[T]he JG [job guarantee] wage rate is set at the minimum wage level …. The 
government thus purchases labour ‘off the bottom’ of the non-governmental 
wage distribution … By maintaining a buffer stock of employment, the JG 
operates according to what economists term a ‘fixed price/floating quantity’ 
rule …. Given that the JG hires at a fixed price in exchange for hours of 
work and does not compete with private sector wages, employment 
redistributions between the private sector and the buffer stock can always be 
achieved to stabilise any wage inflation in the non-JG sector. [Fazi & 
Mitchell, 2017, p. 231, emphasis added] 
 
This argument is crucial, because proponents of a UBI share the same normative 
goals as those who advance a combination of Rawlsian reciprocity and SELR: a 
“trickle up” effect on pay. [Calnitsky, 2017] But a UBI cannot achieve this result 
if it cancels itself out: if the means undercut the desired end. 
 
5 The Rawls/Minsky Alternative: SELR 
I have argued that the UBI proposal is both politically quietistic and unstable 
(self-stultifying). By contrast, I would argue that the proposal to make the state 
of employer of last resort (SELR) focuses our attention on where it should be 
focused: on the worst off, who are in work (or in some other way meeting a 




It focuses on the relative wage structure, the actual wage rate for those in 
employment (as opposed to the broader measure of income inequality) and the 
overall distribution of fair access to capital and a fair distribution of capital. It 
makes a macro-economic case for Rawlsian justice as fair reciprocity that 
harmonizes with its philosophical justification.41 [Hockett, 2019a, 2019b] We 
already know that Rawlsian justice as fairness explicitly requires meaningful 
work and full employment. [Rawls, 1993, p. lvii; Rawls, 2001; Thomas, 2017, p. 
403, fn. 31] Minsky argued on both economic and normative grounds for SELR. 
In this section I will set out Minsky’s critique of a UBI in the form in which he 
was familiar with it: the so-called “negative income tax” also discussed by Rawls. 
[Minsky, 2013]  
 Minsky regarded a UBI – in the guise of a negative income tax – as an 
admission of defeat: “an admission of an inability to make the production process 
respond to social goals”. [Minsky, 2013b, p.30] He also objected to traditional 
approaches to welfare which accepted unemployment as regrettably inevitable, 
for which the answer was re-training. 
 
41 The rhetorical strategy of Hockett [2019a] is to ask why, if the Federal Reserve Bank has a 
dual mandate to target both the rate of inflation and the level of unemployment, it engages in 
so-called “open market operations” to control the interest rate to target inflation, but does not 
control the price of labour in any way. (Hockett calls the interest rate the rental charge for 
money and also notes that the prices of certain key commodities are also, de facto, hedged by 
the state.) This is in spite of the fact that labour is a more extensive factor in economic activity 




He argues that, in a dynamic economy, up-skilling the unemployed for jobs 
that they do not currently have and may not have in the future (because the jobs 
may not exist) is the wrong approach. Don’t fit the citizen to the job; fit the job 
to the citizen with the skill set that they actually have.42 As James K. Galbraith 
has also pointed out, this focus on education and re-training in the absence of a 
commitment to full employment simply re-distributes unemployment and, in the 
process, devalues the skills premium.43 [Galbraith, 1998/2000] The result is that 
people are over-qualified for the jobs that they actually do. 
Minsky argues that an approach that targets poverty, caused by 
unemployment, either by upskilling workers or focusing on their motivations (the 
latter, for example, via “workfare”) does not fit a nut to a bolt; it fits a nut to some 
 
42 Rapidly evolving economies produce workers whose skills profile does not match current 
jobs; even if aggregate demand and supply match in practice, the skills mis-match will still 
produce unemployment.  
43 “It is one thing for a program to hold out, subsidize, and support new chances for individuals 
to compete on the educational and career ladders. It is something different to promise that the 
ladder itself will become shorter and wider as a result of an increase in the numbers crowding 
their way up the rungs. It is something entirely different to suppose that each new entrant and 
and reentrant in the educational sweepstakes will enjoy a chance of success equally high as 
those who have already entered and won. It is something entirely different, bold and ingenious, 
to promise that we can return to the middle-class solidarity of three decades ago, entirely by 
diffusing knowledge through the population and by allowing free labor markets to work.” 




future bolt that may or may not exist.44 Even if the envisaged future jobs do come 
into existence “this approach”, Minsky observed “can spread poverty more 
fairly”, but that is not to eliminate it. [Minsky, 2013a, p. 1] The currently poor 
are enabled to compete between themselves for the limited stock of jobs available. 
Furthermore, whether or not these jobs come into existence is left in the hands of 
private capitalists – the rentier class, once more. 
For Minsky, such re-training can only come later after full employment has 
been reached: 
Once tight full employment is achieved, the second step is to 
generate programs to upgrade workers. I am afraid that in the 
poverty campaign we have taken the second step without the first, 
and perhaps this is analogous to the great error-producing sin of 
infielders – throwing the ball before you have it. [Minsky, 2013a, p. 
25] 
 
For this  envisaged “tight full employment” of 2.5% he assumed that the state 
would have to play the role of employer of last resort as it had in the New Deal. 
[Minsky, 2013g, pp. 159–160] Under such a scheme, the state will employ 
anyone able and willing to work at minimum wage rates.45 
There is a need for permanent instruments of policy which generate 
an infinitely elastic demand for work that is useful. The desirable 
 
44 Minsky focuses, rhetorically, on pre-school education as a form of early years intervention: 
its full effects take twenty years. [Minsky, 2013a, p.20] His underlying point is that, in a 
dynamic economy, re-training is always “too late”. 
45 “This would be a wage support law …. It would replace the minimum wage law; for, if work 
is available to all at the minimum wage, no labor will be available to private employers at a 




situation is that at every moment in time the number of unfilled jobs 
is greater than the number of unemployed. This can only be 
guaranteed if the government acts as an employer who has a vast 
amount of projects that need to be done and is willing and able to 
pay to get those jobs done.  [Minsky, 2013g] 
 
There is a direct connection between Minsky’s work on financial instability and 
crises and his work on employment or, as he would frame it, poverty. 46 Minsky 
was reacting to the privatized Keynesianism of the post-WW2 US recovery 
whose stimulation of private investment took several forms including investment 
tax credits and government contracts with profitable rents “built in” for some 
industries and not others during the Cold War. [Wray, 2013, p. xv] 
Minsky diagnosed why these policies would exacerbate inequality across 
several dimensions: they favoured the rentier class over the worker, thereby 
empowering conspicuous consumption; the state guaranteed rents of post-WWII 
USA were in high skill industries, thus producing a wage premium on skills; at 
the macro-level, investment growth driven by private debt was merely storing up 
trouble. The combination of weak social security and increasing private debt 
drives a system prone to instability. [Minsky, 1986/2008] 
Given that labour is, as Minsky puts it, “heterogeneous and viscous”, as 
opposed to its theoretical representation by economists as “homogenous and 
liquid”, then if a class of worker becomes unemployed because of structural 
change, incentivizing the “right kind” of employer via tax cuts is both ineffective 
 




and too slow. [Minsky, 2013a, p. 13, p. 14] By contrast, the state can absorb those 
workers quickly by changing the pattern of its own spending. [Minsky, 2013a, 
p.19] Above all, there is no time delay as the state takes workers, and their 
existing skill set, as they are. 
A key economic argument for Minsky’s proposal is that, under tight full 
employment as he defines it, the wages of the low paid would rise faster than the 
wages of the comparatively highly paid – a point to which I will return in the next 
section as it is a key lemma in his argument for which the support was (at the 
time) weak.47 [Minsky, 2013a, p. 3, 2013b, p.27] This is key to his overall aim of 
increasing overall consumption by increasing the spending power of the currently 
worst off. He also accepted that there would have to be wage restraint on the part 
of better off workers; the state would need a relative incomes policy.48 [Minsky, 
2013a, p. 18] 
At the macro-level, SELR means that a major cause of financial instability 
is reduced while the state withdraws from the business of incentivizing capital 
investment through tax breaks for existing capital holders. Overall, capital’s share 
of income would be decreased while GNP as a whole will rise – far more, Minsky 
 
47 “Tight full employment …. by setting off market processes which tend to raise low wages 
faster than higher wages …. will in time greatly diminish the poverty due to low income from 
jobs” [Minsky, 2013a, p. 3] 
48 Whereas I have noted that, under a property-owning democracy, rent extraction by the 




predicts, than by the amount one could simply redistribute to end poverty by a 
transfer scheme.49 [Minsky, 2013a, p. 6] 
At the micro-level, SELR means that there is no poverty from joblessness, 
per se, jobs are tailored to workers and not vice versa, labour market participation 
rates will go up, including part-time workers being incentivized to become full 
time. [Minsky, 2013b, p. 27, 2013c, p. 63] Increased labour market participation, 
plus the income sharing role of the family, will see whole families break out of 
poverty traps – “there is no better cure for poverty than family income, especially 
family income earned on a job”. [Minsky, 2013a, p. 3] Minsky also makes the 
psychologically insightful point that on an appropriate measure of well-being – 
not the deracinated version of the neo-classical economist – simply having a job 
contributes to a person’s well-being. [Minsky, 2013c, p. 44]  
Overall, then, SELR has multiple benefits: it helps to stabilize the economy 
as a whole –  compared to the privatized Keynesian alternative with its debt 
driven cycle of crises and “recovery” – while improving the position of the worst 
off as meaningful work will be available for anyone who wants it. Prosperity 
“trickles up” by placing a floor under the wage structure. It simply follows 
through on the logic that if the state puts a floor under prices and assets it must 






 Are people free not to work? Of course, and part of Rawls’s conception of 
justice as reciprocal fairness is the payment of a decent civic minimum.50 But that 
is not a UBI as it is grounded on people’s material needs. Proponents of an UBI 
do not think its level ought to be set merely to cover a person’s basic needs. [Van 
Parijs, 1995, p. 35] So it is a gross misunderstanding to interpret a jobs guarantee 
as the return of the Victorian workhouse. The payment of a decent civic minimum 
means that any citizen is free not to work if she so chooses. 
 
6 Is Minsky’s Lemma Sound? 
 For all that has been argued to this point, there is a damaging flaw in Minsky’s 
argument for SELR as an alternative to a UBI. One assumption of his discussion 
is that if the state places a floor under the wage structure then the result will 
“trickle up”: we will see the wages of the worst off rise more rapidly than the 
wages of those immediately above them.51 However, Minsky’s belief in this 
 
50 I speculate that the payment of this minimum could be a baseline part, but not the whole, of 
the direct payment of money to each citizens by the state via a personal account with the central 
bank in a “Citizens’ Quantitative Easing” program. I say part, and not the whole, as this amount 
must be continuously available whereas in Hockett and James’s proposed “people’s QE” 
withdrawals from these accounts can be temporarily suspended in the interests of macro-
economic stability (while continuing to earn interest). [Hockett & James, forthcoming] 
51 This is key to his overall (Keynesian) vision of “a preference for a low investment, high 
consumption, full-employment economy with a favorable disposition towards organizations 
that are small, thus minimizing bureaucracy”. [Minsky, 1986/2008, p. 329] (Minsky includes 




effect seems restricted to the econometric data in one paper, namely, Anderson 
[1964]. Can more recent work offer a more robust defense of Minsky’s lemma? 
 I think it can as this is the central thesis of James Kenneth Galbraith’s 
Created Unequal. [Galbraith, 1998/2000] Key here is the phrase “the wage 
structure” which underlies the origin of income inequality.52 Galbraith’s highest 
level explanation of the evolution of the wage structure is that the American state 
has been negligent and withdrawn from its responsibilities in macroeconomic 
management. By allowing one goal only – inflation targeting – to influence its 
policies, it has tolerated the building up of a “buffer stock” of the unemployed to 
keep inflation low – just as its monetarist advisers insisted must happen as their 
response to Kalecki’s dilemma. 
For Galbraith, a great deal follows from this misplaced emphasis: most 
notably, exactly the same cycle of mutually reinforcing inequality and instability 
against which Minsky cautioned. The US economy has, over the last fifty years, 
experienced repeated boom and bust recessions, with each recovery being 
weaker, and taking longer to become established, than the one before it.  
 Galbraith combines this high-level explanation with a theory of the 
determination of the wage structure in which a perfectly competitive model of the 
labor market is abandoned. Following Schumpeter, Galbraith takes investment 
 
52 Galbraith’s point is that there are many intermediating variables between the wage structure 
and income inequality, such as family structures, participation rates, variation in the age cohort 




by firms in research and development with the aim of seeking a monopoly, 
however fleeting, to be the essence of the dynamic efficiency of capitalism. 
[Galbraith, 1998/2000] 
Given that a degree of monopoly is inevitable, it is a good thing that he 
welcomes it as potentially stabilizing in a stable macroeconomic context set by 
the state. But, given the state’s abdication of its responsibility, the interaction of 
instability and private monopoly has been disastrous for the structure of 
American wages. Under conditions of macroeconomic instability, it is the most 
vulnerable, most poorly paid and precarious, workers who do the least well.  
 The price setting power of a monopoly is a zero sum exercise of market 
power: greater price setting power for one firm means diminished power (and 
profit) for at least one other firm. For the monopolist there is a rent component to 
profit; Galbraith’s hypothesis is that the extent to which firms have to share their 
monopoly rents with key employees varies firm by firm and sector by sector. A 
prominent technology company, for example, will see its senior management 
forced to share its niche rents with its top software talent to retain them. The same 
may be true of its “non-production” talent like its marketing department. This is 
not true for the office cleaners who are, in all likelihood, outsourced to an agency. 
 This latter phenomenon is what David Weil famously called the creation 
of a “fissured workplace”: the large, “superstar” corporation outsources those 
functions for which it does not need to share its rents with key employees to a 




down wages and non-financial benefits (and skirt the boundaries of legality in 
labour law).53 Supply chains are moved offshore, where working conditions are 
pay may be even worse. [Weil, 2014] This fissuring of the workplace is the direct 
effect of removing political support from under the wage structure, in 
combination with the ideology at the level of the firm that their corporate goal is 
maximizing shareholder value.  
 The other dimension to this issue is that of “precariousness”. If your lens 
on the labor market is the traditional competitive markets assumption, then the 
“spot contract” is desirable for the highly skilled professional with whom a firm 
is forced to share rent, such as a top flight mathematician selling her services as 
a rocket scientist to work on derivatives pricing for an investment bank. Here, 
precariousness is compensated for by the scale of the remuneration and the belief 
in efficient markets incentivizes that worker to seek the spot price for her services. 
Working on a consultancy basis may be more lucrative than being an employee 
of the bank; the loss of the benefits of being a permanent employee on the payroll 
may be compensated for by higher pay. 
By contrast, the spot contract is of no help to those with no bargaining 
power; on the contrary, it exploits their vulnerability. The person who cleans the 
office in which the derivatives expert works is not in a comparable situation to 
 
53 This re-states Galbraith’s insight that monopoly is zero sum, so our corporate landscape is 
split between rent-extracting monopolistic firms enjoying superhigh returns, and an extensive 




that of the expert. In the Schumpeter/Galbraith framework, the competitive labour 
market assumption loses its force, and the relevant fact is that precariousness is a 
way of using the “industrial reserve army” of the unemployed to keep wages low 
by replacing the unionized worker with the day worker and the employee with a 
succession of “contingent” workers. One dimension of income inequality is 
radical income fluctuation as workers with no bargaining power move in and out 
of work. Once again, it is a political choice to allow working conditions to 
deteriorate in this way: the fragmentation of employment is thus both 
organizational and temporal, fissured and precarious. 
 For Galbraith, the primary form that inequality takes is distributed across  
sectors and firms in this way: this is not a story about superstar employees, but 
superstar firms. [Furman & Orszag, 2018] They may very well have achieved this 
status through state incentivization by the creation of rent-seeking niches, or they 
may seek to perpetuate their historically prior adVantage via lobbying. 
[Galbraith, 2009] Either way, Galbraith agrees with Minsky that investment has 
been channeled to the wrong parts of the US economy.54 
For the very worst off who are in work, their vulnerability is such that their 
employers are under no pressure to share any rents with them. Predominantly in 
 
54 In Marianna Mazzucato’s version of the argument public investment has been parasitically 
exploited by private firms who leverage publicly accessible patents into products that generate 
profits for them that they do not return to the public by paying fair corporate taxes. [Mazzucato, 




services, or in service roles in other sectors, absent a policy of SELR the level of 
their wages is politically determined by the value of the minimum wage and the 
extent to which they are unionized. Their bargaining power, viewed through the 
lens of the fully competitive assumption, is individually negligible. Viewed 
through Galbraith’s Smith-Schumpeter lens we reach the same conclusion: only 
political will stops the pay of the worst off dropping to near subsistence. Yet, as 
Minsky develops the argument, the political price that the rentier class demands 
for putting in place the automatic entitlements of a welfare state is inequality as 
a whole, and structural unemployment as one aspect of it. 
 Galbraith concludes that under the political conditions prevailing in the 
USA from 1970 – 1998 the wage structure was allowed to erode from the bottom 
up. The state’s macroeconomic negligence tolerated an unstable environment in 
which firms have had little choice to but shed their most vulnerable workers in a 
downturn. Firms themselves have adopted the goal of maximizing shareholder 
value to justify making employments either temporary, contracted out, or 
offshored (where the latter is applicable). The state’s political negligence has seen 
a sustained assault on unionization, an insufficient minimum wage but, above all, 
a refusal to put a floor under employment. 
 Galbraith thereby supports Minsky’s claim that changed macroeconomic 
policies will see the wages of the worst off rise more quickly than the wages of 
those immediately above them in the wage hierarchy. [Minsky, 2013b, p. 27] 




driven down to subsistence, but the underpinnings of the wage structure are 
political – a matter of public policy – and in that sense not market determined at 
all. 
The condition of tight full employment where employers would aim to 
employ more workers than they currently do would lift the worse off into a 
situation where their collective bargaining power would be substantially 
increased as a category.  Furthermore, this is across all industrial sectors and firms 
without regard for their degree of unionization.55 In my view, Galbraith’s analysis 
substantiates why Minsky’s lemma is true and, furthermore, why this is a “trickle 
up” theory for addressing income inequality of interest to the Rawlsian, 
particularly given the elimination of (special incentive grounded) rents. 
[Tcherneva, 2011]  
If Galbraith is right, then we also have a point of connection not only with 
Minsky, but also Van Parijs’s focus on unearned rents. The state, acting as 
dishonest broker, has handed out lucrative rental niches to sectors and firms and 
then, under a dysfunctional “tax farming arrangement”, simply failed to tax back 
the resultant profit. In other sectors rents are minimal, profit margins low, and the 
 
55 “The cohesiveness of relative wages and the importance of key trade union contracts in 
setting a pattern for wage increases depend upon the overall tightness in the labor market. In 
particular, wage gains in industries with weak trade unions – such as textiles – or with 
essentially no trade unions – such as retail trade – will keep up with or even improve on the 
bargains struck in highly organized industries such as steel and automobiles only if the labor 




salient politics is that of the minimum wage. All parties are agreed, then, that 
these unfair rents ought to be taxed away. Only under a property-owning 
democracy, or liberal market socialism, will we have the collective assurance that 
such rents will have been eliminated. 
 
7 Two Routes to the Same Mountain Summit? 
It would be a mistake to put artificial distance between the approach defended in 
this paper and that of Van Parijs: both are versions of “Left Rawlsianism”. [Van 
Parijs, 1995, p. 297, fn. 75] When Karl Polanyi famously remarked that labour, 
land and money were “fictitious commodities”, one interpretation of that remark 
is that it is classical political economy that theorises in the light of a fiction, 
namely, that these are “factors of production” alongside other factors of 
production. [Polanyi, 1944] But they are not: as Polanyi slightly obscurely puts 
it, these factors are not “produced for the market”. I think the most helpful way 
to conceptualise the deep similarity between Rawls and Van Parijs is to see them 
both as theorizing the de-commodification of land, labour and money. They 
develop two strategies for implementing Polanyi’s insight even if they go about 
this project in different ways.56 
 
56 Van Parijs tries to widen the scope of our Georgist intuitions about land to jobs as assets; at 
a crucial moment in his argument Rawls seems to do the same. Accepting the difference 
principle is to accept the endogenously given stock of human talents as if it were a pooled 
commodity exogenously given – in other words, just like land. [Rawls, 2001, §21 et seq] But 




Yet these paths converge: Van Parijs makes a compelling case that a 
property-owning democracy plus a jobs guarantee is on a par with his own 
proposal even given his own assumptions. Given that I reject two of those key 
assumptions  – that justice does not require full employment, and that full 
employment is incompatible with liberal neutrality – I think we have a case for 
moving beyond the UBI proposal. 
 I believe that my identification of the fundamental disagreement is correct: 
Rawls seeks an alternative to capitalism while Van Parijs defends an “optimised” 
capitalism.57 This disagreement is sharpened when it comes to  full employment. 
The latter’s view that a preference for a job is grounded on ethical 
“perfectionism” is, yet again, crucial. [Van Paris, 1995, p.98] If his critique is that 
a neutralist liberal cannot endorse such a controversial ethical principle, then Van 
 
My aim in this paper is to argue that a Rawlsian approach does not de-commodify labour via 
this analogy with land; we de-commodify it via an analogy with money. The monetarily 
sovereign state ought to be the monopoly supplier of both money and labour and, in so doing, 
de-commodify the latter. [Hockett, 2019; Thomas, 2020b]  
57 Van Parijs’s list includes: a corporatist state that manages a “grand bargain” between 
organised capital and organised labour where both sides exercise restraint in the distribution of 
the productive surplus; anti-trust and anti-monopoly legislation; a sphere of petty production 
where, above a certain size, all firms are worker owned but still receive external investment; 
an investment class willing to assume business risk with no control (as part of the preceding 
scheme); Weitzman’s scheme in which wages are a vector of a fixed sum plus a share of a 
firm’s profits; widely distributed share ownership as in Meade’s property-owning democracy. 
This is all outlined in the culminating chapter six of Real Freedom for All and its justification 




Parijs must be committed to the consistent alternative. In his neutralist liberalism 
it is of no concern to the state how many people are employed as opposed to being 
recipients a UBI. Yet it also seems to be true that a UBI funded by the rents 
inherent in scarce job assets requires some people to be employed. Furthermore, 
the scarcer the jobs, the higher the rents, and the higher the funds available for a 
UBI. Forcing the labour market to clear is, once again, discriminatory. [Van 
Parijs, 1995, p. 112] Yet the overriding criterion for any socio-economic 
distribution is basic income maximisation. 
It is worth bearing in mind this disconnection when reading Van Parijs’s 
explanations of technical solutions to unemployment in an optimised capitalism: 
were the state actively to pursue any of these policies it would be acting in an 
illiberal way. Deepening the puzzle here is the active role he gives the state in 
underpinning a corporatist settlement between capital and labour: it is, to use my 
metaphor, an “honest broker” between competing societal interests. If the state 
gets its policies right, we will have stable full employment, but this could only 
ever be an accidental side effect of state action – or it would be discriminatory 
against those who want to be voluntarily unemployed.   
 However, there are significant points of convergence between the two 
views I have discussed here. Van Parijs endorses contra-cyclical demand 
management of a “Keynesian” type. [Van Paris, 1995, p.204] He also thinks that 
the effects of business cycle fluctuations on employment will be further 




as opposed to income from employment.58 [Van Paris, 1995, p. 205; Weitzman, 
1984] Crucially, he also endorses Meade’s version of a property-owning 
democracy, singling out for approval Meade’s hybrid combination of an income 
derived from a share of wealth with the payment of an unconditional basic 
income. [Van Paris, 1995, p.295, fn 75]  
 But this is misleading: this is not the perspective where one begins from 
the ideal of full employment as an essential way in which we collectively de-
commodify labour and, holding that commitment fixed, “solve” for price 
stability. [Hockett, 2019] From Van Parijs’s perspective, classic economic theory 
can allow that involuntary unemployment is remediable by the state’s “second 
best” public option – as, Van Parijs dismissively remarks, “at sufficiently low 
wages”.59 [Van Paris, 1995, p. 193] That situation, from his perspective, is not an 
 
58 In his subtle discussion he actually distinguishes two ways of addressing unemployment 
caused by under-consumption: Keynesian demand management ought, in his view, to be 
combined with Martin Weitzman’s proposal for a share economy in which workers’ 
remuneration is a combination of a fixed wage with a share in that firm’s profits. 
Unemployment generated by the Kaleckian profit squeeze – the “excessive” power of workers 
– has to be addressed by worker self-restraint in a corporatist social bargain, supplemented by 
Peter Jay style worker co-operatives where workers own firms but still raise external capital 
from investors. (This involves, to my mind not very plausibly, another aspect of “corporatism” 
whereby investors choose to bear risk with no control rights at all.) 
59 The argument of Hockett [2019] and Thomas [2020] is that the public option is not a second 
grade fallback position but, as that which de-commodifies labour, functions as the legitimation 
of the private employment market. As Hockett puts it “the whole point of the OLMO, ELR, JG 
regime is not only to assure  remunerative work for all who might seek it, but also to use this 




“envy free” distribution because “many jobs are bound to be envied, in a socialist 
society too, by people who are deprived of access to them”. [Van Paris, 1995, 
p.193] So job rents will persist. And that circles back to his key argument that a 
preference for being employed is a controversial ethical principle. [Van Paris, 
1995, pp. 109–113, p. 193] 
Yet, because Van Parijs’s version of a property-owning is a hybrid, he has 
not taken into account that the distributions of job assets in a property-owning 
democracy will have eliminated special incentives payable to the talented.60 
[Smith, 1998, p. 225; Thomas, 2017, p. 162] So the talented will not be able, as 
Kalecki feared, to bid up their wages under full employment and make their 
enviable jobs even more enviable because even better paid.61 This is important, 
 
2019, p. 121] This priority in justification is obscured by the macro-economic role of the JG, 
namely, “a buffer stock of paid jobs that expands (declines) when private sector activity 
declines (expands)”. [Fazi & Mitchell, 2017, p. 231] 
60 By a “hybrid” here I mean a combination of a welfare state capitalism that has replaced 
conditional transfers with an unconditional UBI, plus the asset-based focus of a property-
owning democracy. In my own [2017] by contrast I defend a “non-hybrid” fully predistributive 
version of a property-owning democracy that reflects Rawls’s decisive break with welfare state 
capitalism.  
61 Skills feature importantly in Van Parijs’s individuation of job “types” that is one source of 
his job rents. This is not the place for what would have to be a lengthy excursus on whether the 
distribution of job assets in a property-owning democracy would be “envy free” in Van Parijs’s 
sense. Envy does feature in Rawls’s discussion: one argument for the difference principle is 
that it regulates an entire socio-economic regime in a way that would eliminate reasonable envy 
on the part of the worst off. [Rawls, 1971/1999, p. 468, p.534] It is important that the difference 




because Van Parijs takes the Kalecki argument that unemployment is a political 
choice driven by the rentier-investor class seriously. It calls for the most extensive 
optimisation of his preferred form of reformed capitalism. 
Given the thoroughness of his treatment, it is perhaps unsurprising that Van 
Parijs explains how, in fact, his own view would strongly converge with Rawls’s 
view (and my own) if we dropped the claim that a preference for a job was a form 
of ethical perfectionism. If, instead, we put in place policies that actually 
eliminated involuntary unemployment he thinks it probable that the elimination 
of job rents would be balanced by a worker’s higher return on her productive 
investments. 
Under full employment there would be, as Van Parijs admits, “no 
employment rents to be collected”. [Van Parijs, 1995, p. 112] In this scenario, an 
unconditional basic income will depend solely on an extension of a Georgist 
approach to land taxes to all our unearned, inherited, stock of capital. That is, for 
Van Parijs, prima facie a disappointing result. However, he also notes that an 
extension of a property-owning democracy that gave all citizens fair access to 
productive capital, including that invested in productive firms of all kinds, would 
see returns on those investments boosted under full employment: 
 
and not for the specific allotment of roles within that system (such as job types). [ Rawls, 
1971/1999, p. 229; Thomas, 2017, p.84] I think it is enough for present purposes to note that 
“envy freedom” is not a fundamental regulative principle for distribution for Rawls as it is for 




[T]his fall in wages would result in higher returns on physical and financial 
assets, and hence in a significant increase in the value of society’s capital. 
As a consequence, people’s per capita share of external assets in the 
standard sense would be greater, and the maximum level of basic income 
that could be financed by taxing those assets could therefore be expected to 
be significantly higher than it is with wages as they stand. [Van Parijs, 1995, 
p. 112, emphasis added] 
 
Rawls thinks that to move beyond capitalism we need to transition either to liberal 
market socialism or to a property-owning democracy because both are non-
capitalist (in his proprietary sense). I have argued that actually only one of these 
options uniquely realises justice. [Thomas, 2017] Van Parijs is committed to a 
limited property-owning democracy anyway as one – essential – way in which he 
“optimises” capitalism.62 
 So it transpires that a more comprehensive property-owning democracy, 
plus full employment, would go a long way towards meeting Van Parijs’s 
egalitarian goals without his claim that jobs are assets in which everyone must 
have an equal tradeable share, the voluntarily and involuntarily unemployed 
alike. There is a way of dropping Van Parijs’s least plausible claim, but still 
producing significant convergence between the two parties to this dispute. Full 
employment boosts the values of productive assets “in the standard sense”. 
Combine this with the other components of Van Parijs’s “optimised capitalism” 
 
62 Van Parijs at one point treats a UBI as functionally equivalent to the assets held in a property-
owning democracy and, in fact, being even more conducive to enterprise as the entrepreneur 





and I would argue that we would be moving beyond capitalism to a non-capitalist 
alternative. [Thomas, 2017, 2020b] What we have not done is vindicate a UBI, 
as opposed to a decent civic minimum plus returns on the citizen’s fair share of 
productive capital. 
 I think has a bearing on the vexed question of how to transition from 
actually existing capitalism either to a property-owning democracy with full 
employment, or to Van Parijs’s alternative. This question of political agency has 
to be addressed in tandem with Van Parijs’s fatalism about globalisation in his 
1995 book. [Van Paris, 1995, pp.224–6] Reflecting the influence of Susan 
Strange, his view was that no sovereign nation-state any longer has the domestic 
capacity to implement re-distributive policies owing to the pressures of trans-
national capitalism.63 His optimal socialism is forced to trade off democratic 
control of the economy with a resource “levelling down” that will prove to be 
unstable. We can putatively meet Kalecki’s point about the threat of capital flight 
or capital strike by enhancing popular sovereignty. This would express itself in 
the “political community’s ability to steer the use of its resources according to its 
democratically determined will”. Yet this is ultimately to no avail given his view 
of globalisation:  
 
63 See, for example, Strange [1997] of which Fazi and Mitchell note “no book epitomises this 
new consensus better” – that is, the consensus that “the sovereignty of nation-states has been 
progressively eroded by globalisation, and has today been essentially nullified”. [Fazi & 




The ownership of the means of production by the political community 
protects a socialist society against its redistributive policies being thwarted 
by the private capital owners’ decisions to stop investing or invest abroad. 
[Van Paris, 1995, p.189] 
 
So this reassertion of democratic sovereignty will be undermined by the forces of 
globalisation as the nation-state’s talented workers will migrate for more reward 
in other cultures of capitalism, hence capitalism ultimately wins once again – at 
least, in its trans-national variant. 
 In my view, this simply takes us back to the Gourevitch and Stanczyk point 
about political agency: if we had sufficient democratic agency to bring about a 
UBI, then would not need it. And Van Parijs’ corrosive scepticism about any 
democratic agency in a nation-state, given his conception of globalisation, only 
exacerbates that problem.64 
Domestically, his technical solution to the Kaleckian “profit squeeze” 
critique is a stable form of social corporatism where the state plays the role of an 
honest broker between competing social interests. Both workers and the private 
investment class restrain themselves. It is crucial to this solution that neither side 
ask “too much”: workers must moderate the share of the productive surplus that 
their bargaining power would otherwise give them while the rentier-investor class 
 
64 This is not the place for consideration of the wider issue. It is consistent for Van Parijs to 
seek to democratise trans-national structures to create the domestic “space” for egalitarian 
policy; however, this puts the progressive in the – to my mind unnecessary – position of 
fighting on all fronts at once. For countervailing considerations against this globalisation 




must continue to invest while relinquishing any role in managerial control (for 
example, via their voting rights or their ability to appoint and dismiss directors). 
Given that option, the rentier-investor class must also be persuaded to continue 
to invest domestically and not overseas – notwithstanding Van Parijs’s assertion 
that they will not. It is true that the historical record shows that globalisation 
offers no reassurance on either point.65 
The crux, once again, is that Van Parijs thinks that a basic income 
maximising capitalism, suitably optimised, can be legitimised because it is fair. 
[Van Parijs, 1995, p. 208] Yet, it seems to me, Van Parijs’s liberal state is trapped 
into inconsistency. It could take policy measures to bring about full employment, 
but only by being discriminatory; it is committed to maximising a basic income, 
a goal that is best secured by making jobs scarce. Is it thereby adVancing the aim 
of fairness? That would seem to be precisely the point at issue. Given Van Parijs’s 
concession that a fully implemented property-owning democracy with a jobs 
 
65 One way to confirm Kalecki’s diagnosis is that one response to “excessive” worker power 
would be an even stronger backlash against organised labour from organised capital in the form 
of deliberately caused recessions, the offshoring of manufacturing where unionisation was 
strong, anti-union legislation and other measures to break the power of labour.  If you choose 
to call this co-option of the state to drive income and wealth upwards “neo-liberalism” then, as 
Monica Prasad points out, the neo-liberal revolution was strongest in those countries – the UK 
and the USA – where organised labour was at its strongest prior to the backlash. A political 
coalition was mobilised against workers in those countries who were perceived to be “asking 
for too much”. [Prasad, 2006] That a certain conception of globalisation has been imposed to 
reinforce this process of strengthening the power of trans-national capital against domestic 




guarantee would approximate to his egalitarian aims in any case, I suggest that 
the balance of reasons tells against his version of “real freedom for all”. However, 
only a minor change in strategy would see him move away from a UBI within an 
optimised capitalism to a decisive break with capitalism in the form of a property-
owning democracy that includes a jobs guarantee.66 
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